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Abstract 
This paper examines how decentralization and informalization are reshaping urban 
governance in contemporary Africa. By exploring the interface between urban 
institutional failures and popular organizational solutions, the paper considers how 
informal governance processes feed into wider structural and political outcomes. 
Attention paid to issues of institutional process and power relations reveals how the 
limited access of the poor to resources and decisionmaking structures may distort rather 
than enhance their agency within decentralized urban governance systems. Drawing on 
case studies of informal enterprise associations in Christian and Muslim parts of 
Nigeria, this paper explores the differing ways in which networks of ethnicity, class and 
religion are used to forge links between dynamic informal organizational systems and 
formal institutions of government. The varied outcomes of these efforts raise 
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uncomfortable questions about whether the proliferation of popular networks and 
associations amid weak formal institutions is tipping African cities onto trajectories of 
popular empowerment and pro-poor growth, or instigating a downward slide into 
violence and urban decay. 
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1 Introduction 
The contemporary policy emphasis on decentralization, deregulation and 
democratization has turned African cities into complex places. Urban Africa is beset by 
cross-cutting processes of high unemployment, popular livelihood strategies, collapsing 
physical and social infrastructure, communal service provision, patrimonialism and 
burgeoning civil society. As Pieterse (2005: 139) points out in a recent collection on 
urban Africa, ‘Despite the speed and intensity of urban change it is clear that agency is 
flourishing and much remains to be done to recast political practice in the city toward a 
more comprehensive understanding of what is going on...’. 
In this paper I will explore the question of how popular organizational strategies and 
coping mechanisms affect broader trajectories of urban governance in contemporary 
Africa. This question demands that we move beyond the micro-social focus on 
individual agency and resource mobilization, and beyond the macro-social focus on 
structural outcomes and institutional failure. It requires instead an examination of the 
link between popular strategies and structural outcomes, which takes account of how 
institutional process and power relations shape the access of the poor to resources and 
decisionmaking structures within African urban environments. By exploring the 
interface between informal and formal governance processes, we can begin to 
understand whether the interaction of weak and decentralized formal institutions and 
proliferating popular networks and associations is tipping African cities onto trajectories 
of popular empowerment and pro-poor growth, or instigating a downward slide into 
violence and urban decay.  
In accordance with recent insightful analyses of poverty and urban governance in 
Africa, I understand governance to mean the regulatory effect of the interaction between 
government and non-governmental forces: ‘Governance is thus about ... the way the 
power structures of the day and civil society interrelate to produce a civic public realm’ 
(Rakodi 2001: 344). As many contemporary studies have pointed out, understanding 
governance processes in the highly informalized environments of urban Africa requires 
a focus not only on organized civil society, but on the ‘morass of complex networks and 
arenas within which power dynamics are expressed and deployed’ (Healey 2000: 919). 
Drawing on this observation, I make a distinction between informal governance 
processes, which relate to the regulatory role of social networks, informal institutions 
and popular associations; and formal governance processes, which involve the role of 
formal political, economic and social institutions. The objective of this paper is to 
examine how informal governance processes have been shaped by contemporary 
political and economic reforms in the formal sphere, and to consider how they have in 
turn affected wider processes of urban governance. 
Theoretical approaches to informal governance processes have evolved rapidly over the 
past two decades. Amid efforts to conceptualize informal or ‘non-state’ governance 
processes, concepts such as social networks, social capital, embeddedness, civil society 
and informal institutions have risen to prominence (Granovetter 1985; North 1990; 
Putnam 1993a). While these concepts have helped to theorize popular forms of resource 
mobilization and political organization, they often fail to explain how informal forms of 
organization feed into political outcomes. The missing link, as Beall (2001) points out 
in her work on poverty and urban governance, revolves around the question of how 
issues of power influence the dynamics of informal organization, and shape their impact 
on wider processes of governance. 
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Some commentators on third-world cities have followed Putnam in representing 
effective informal governance as a function of social ‘connectivity’, or ‘social capital’ 
(Putnam 1993b). They see the proliferation of popular organizational arrangements in 
times of economic stress as a means of creating ‘new institutional frameworks’ for 
service provision and citizen participation (Hansen and Vaa 2004; Tati 2001). A 
contrasting perspective suggests that there is more to popular empowerment than mere 
connectivity. More detailed analyses of the networks of the poor have drawn 
distinctions between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties (Granovetter 1983: 224), or ‘risk-
reducing’ and ‘productivity enhancing’ networks (Barr 1999). The underlying argument 
is that the density of social connection is less important than what they connect urban 
dwellers to. Dense, solidary links to other poor people are associated with a lack of 
resources and political influence, while effective networks require links with more 
influential segments of society. Indeed, studies of poor African communities have 
shown that dense horizontal ties and popular associations can exacerbate rather than 
reduce vulnerability and disorder ( Lourenço-Lindell 2002; Simone 2001). 
The recognition that informal resource mobilization and associational life do not 
necessarily translate into popular empowerment has encouraged greater attention to 
issues of power relations rather than organizational capacity. On the one hand, poverty 
and insecurity undermine the ability of the poor to form politically effective 
associations. Studies have observed that poor urban dwellers tend to privilege 
livelihoods over collective action, while their economic, legal and social marginality 
constrains their ability to represent their interests in the wider arena of urban politics, 
often leaving them vulnerable to political capture (Beall 2001; Mitlin 2001; Thulare 
2004). On the other hand, weak formal institutions in third-world cities further 
undermine conditions for effective public action among the poor. Efforts at devolved 
public authority have tended not to foster popular empowerment. Decentralization is 
often hasty and poorly institutionalized, leaving municipal and local governments weak, 
disorganized, inadequately trained, and under-resourced relative to the new range of 
responsibilities they are expected to take on ( Benton 1992; Devas 2001). 
In the face of popular powerlessness and weak formal institutions, decentralization and 
popular participation initiatives in many third-world cities have tended to promote 
cliental rather than democratic forms of engagement, which minimize demands of 
transparency and accountability. These cliental arrangements serve ‘at best to influence 
communities in the choices that they make and at worst may reinforce the dependency 
of the urban poor on more powerful structures and processes’ (Mitlin 2001: 384)—an 
anti-developmental dynamic referred to by Tendler (2002) as ‘the devil’s deal’. The 
analyses of empirical cases that follow in this paper reveal that even well established 
and dynamic livelihood networks and associations have tended to follow the 
disempowering trajectory of ‘the devil’s deal’ rather than fostering societal connectivity 
and political empowerment. The heart of the problem, as I will show, has less to do with 
a lack of social capital and connectivity across social cleavages than with the power to 
make connections work in favour of the poor. 
I will explore the impact of popular networks and associations on urban governance in 
the context of three dynamic enterprise clusters located in two cities in Nigeria. Both 
cities constitute regional commercial centres with populations of around one million 
inhabitants, and the three study clusters are noted for their economic dynamism and 
globalized production networks (Forrest 1994; Meagher 2007b; O’Hear 1987). As such, 
they represent ‘best case’ scenarios of popular governance, in which social networks 
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and informal institutions have supported dynamic livelihood strategies and strong, 
socially embedded producers’ associations. At the same time, these enterprise clusters 
offer useful contrasts involving distinctive migration histories, differing patterns of 
ethnic, religious, class and gender relations, and different political relations with the 
local government. Amid these similarities and contrasts, all three cases reveal a similar 
trajectory involving the proliferation and fragmentation of popular networking and 
associational strategies in the wake of economic and political restructuring, in ways that 
have tended to undermine collective action, popular empowerment and civil order. 
2 The paradox of popular governance: A tale of three clusters 
In a country famous for its informal economic activity, the Nigerian enterprise clusters 
of Ilorin and Aba stand out as particularly impressive cases of small-firm dynamism. All 
three enterprise clusters have made use of indigenous ethnic and religious institutions to 
generate expanding employment, enterprise development and globalizing economic 
networks in the face of collapsing state provision. These small producers are embedded 
in dense webs of associational life involving neighbourhood and hometown 
associations, local political associations, social clubs, religious societies and cluster 
associations. While these popular economic and political networks have expanded since 
the implementation of Nigeria’s structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986, their 
capacity to promote pro-poor development has declined. As I have detailed elsewhere 
(Meagher 2007b), the problem does not lie in ethnic divisions or other organizational 
deficiencies of African social networks, as suggested by commentators on the 
contemporary African malaise (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999; Castells 1998). In fact, 
these three Nigerian clusters reveal a capacity to use ethnic and religious networks to 
build ties across social cleavages in the interest of economic expansion. 
The Ilorin weaving cluster is considered the preserve of indigenes of the city, although 
weavers originally came from a range of ethnic backgrounds, including Yoruba, Nupe, 
Fulani and Hausa, fused into an Ilorin Yoruba identity during the pre-colonial era 
(Meagher 2007b; O’Hear 1987). An unmechanized, traditionally male activity, the 
weaving of Ilorin cloth (aso-oke) is organized through Yoruba institutions of 
apprenticeship, production and credit networks, under the authority of a weavers’ guild 
which remains the main weavers’ association in the town. Although weaving remains 
associated with backwardness and a lack of western education, the elegance and high 
status of Ilorin cloth has led to rising demand since the era of colonialism, making 
weaving an important source of employment, accumulation and social advancement. A 
period of expansion since the 1970s has drawn in labour from surrounding non-Yoruba 
and non-Muslim communities, as well as incorporating women into the traditionally 
male activity of narrow loom weaving. 
By contrast, the Aba shoe and garment clusters emerged in the late colonial period, and 
involve ‘modern’ rather than traditional activities—the making of western shoes and 
clothes. Aba itself is a colonial city founded in the early 1900s as an administrative 
centre and trading entrepôt in an area with no history of urbanization (Forrest 1994; 
Martin 1988). The Aba garment cluster was founded by migrants from the relatively 
prosperous ‘Old Bende’ area of eastern Igboland, while the artisanal shoe cluster was 
pioneered by migrants from the poor, land-hungry community of Mbaise in central 
Igboland. Despite the emergence of an overarching Igbo ethnicity during the colonial 
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period, both communities are still regarded as migrants in Aba, which is located in the 
territory of the Ngwa community of southern Igboland. The organization and cohesion 
of these clusters are based on a range of shared indigenous economic institutions, 
including the system of hometown-based occupational specialization, a remarkably 
effective apprenticeship system, and inter-communal credit and trading networks 
(Isichei 1976; Silverstein 1983). 
Although they are linked by shared cultural institutions, the Aba shoe and garment 
clusters have been shaped by contrasting socioeconomic histories. On the one hand, 
small-scale garment production is a mechanized activity, involving comparatively high 
capital costs and educational requirements. Migrants from the Bende area dominate the 
activity owing to advantaged access to capital and education, rather than through any 
pre-colonial links with textile production. As distinct from Ilorin weaving, the 
traditional division of labour allows a high participation of women in small-scale 
garment production, where women’s clothes are produced by women. By contrast, 
informal shoe production has remained a male pursuit, owing to the low status and 
physically arduous character of the activity. Aba’s small-scale shoe production is an 
unmechanized activity, and was initially relatively unskilled. Like Bende migrants, 
Mbaise shoe producers had no indigenous history of shoe production or leather 
working. Resource-strapped Mbaise migrants turned to small-scale shoe production 
owing to its extremely low capital and skill threshold, marking the activity as a ‘poor 
man’s business’. Over time, however, skills, equipment and materials have become 
more sophisticated, leading to the production of western ‘fashion shoes’. Both clusters 
have expanded gradually since the 1970s, drawing in entrants from a growing range of 
Igbo and even non-Igbo communities. 
Despite their extremely varied histories, all three clusters have responded dynamically 
to the challenges of economic restructuring. From the mid-1980s, the economy has been 
wracked by dramatic devaluation, skyrocketing inflation and crippling unemployment. 
Economic reforms have devastated the formal manufacturing sector, where capacity 
utilization fell from 70 per cent in 1980 to 41 per cent in 2002, and manufacturing 
growth declined by over 2 per cent per year from 1991 to 1999 (Adebiyi and Babatope-
Obasa 2004: 2). Yet, over the same period, all three of these small-enterprise clusters 
generated expanding levels of employment, income and consumer goods (Brautigam 
1997). During the 1990s, the Ilorin weaving cluster was estimated to have directly 
employed over 10,000 people, not to mention those involved in input and output trade. 
At its peak in the early 1990s, the weaving cluster had a turnover of over US$12 million 
annually. Even more impressively, the Aba shoe and garment clusters together 
employed over 58,000 people, with a combined annual turnover of over US$200 million 
(Table 1).   
Table 1 
Small-enterprise cluster employment and turnover at the turn of the millennium 
Cluster No. of  firms 
Total  
employment 
Annual turnover
(US$ millions) 
Occupational 
specialization (%)
Ilorin weavinga 529 10,374  12.2 69.2 
Aba garmentsb  2,423 12,115  29.8 72.9 
Aba shoesb 11,497 46,053 179.3 85.5 
Notes:  a Data refer to peak performance in the early 1990s of firms still operating in 2004. 
 b Data are for the 1999-2000 production season. 
Source:  Fieldwork. 
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Nor were these clusters confined to purely local circuits of production and trade. 
Demand from structurally adjusted consumers across Africa and ties with well 
developed ethnic trading networks have linked these small firms into increasingly 
global circuits of supply and distribution. As indicated in Table 2, the majority of 
weavers and shoe producers, and a smaller share of garment producers, supply markets 
in other African countries through business relations with traders from across Africa. 
Over 60 per cent of weavers also supply markets in Europe and North America, owing 
to demand from a growing African diaspora. All three clusters also subcontract to the 
formal sector. Cross-ethnic and formal sector linkages are facilitated by the pervasive 
use of business cards, and more recently by mobile phone contacts. The dynamism of 
these enterprise networks is all the more impressive when it is recognized that the firms 
involved remain largely informal. Eighty per cent of garment firms and virtually all of 
the weaving and shoe firms were unregistered, and all of them evaded some taxes, as 
well as labour and factory regulations. 
Overall, Castells’ (1998) notion that African societies are condemned to marginalization 
owing to state decay and networks that are not ‘switched on’ seems misplaced in the 
context of these expanding, globalized, mobile phone-wielding micro-enterprise 
networks. Yet this wealth of social capital has not succeeded in fostering more effective 
and participatory urban governance in the wake of economic and political restructuring. 
Instead, the pressures of structural reforms have weakened rather than strengthened 
collective action in the service of popular livelihoods. 
 Table 2 
Marketing networks (% of firms) 
Cluster 
Main market 
outside town 
Distribution to:  
Subcontract  
to formal sector 
Use of business 
card 
other African 
countries 
Europe/North 
America 
Ilorin weaving  98.1 86.5 63.5 84.6 80.8 
Aba garments  39.0 16.4 1.6 36.1 49.2 
Aba shoes  98.0 74.6 2.8 25.4 26.8 
Source:  Fieldwork. 
3 Economic stress and the individuation of network strategies 
The impression of popular economic dynamism created by the remarkable growth of 
these Nigerian enterprise clusters masks growing socioeconomic stress, which has 
fragmented rather than integrated networking strategies among the urban poor. 
Neoliberal reforms and intense livelihood pressures have triggered a flood of entries 
into informal enterprise clusters from a growing range of social groups. More than half 
of existing enterprises in the Ilorin weaving cluster have started up since the onset of 
structural adjustment, rising to over 80 per cent in the two Aba clusters. Not only has 
this generated unprecedented levels of competition among firms, but it has also 
precipitated a rapid social restructuring of informal business networks, unleashing new 
tensions of identity, generation, class and gender. 
Table 3 indicates the main trends in social restructuring within these small-enterprise 
clusters that were originally dominated by groups who lacked the resources and 
education to gain access to jobs in the ‘modern’ sector. Communally, the dominance of 
Ilorin indigenes was preserved in the weaving cluster owing to ethnic assimilation and 
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direct regulation by the weavers’ association (one-third of weavers no longer knew their 
ethnic origins, and even those of non-Yoruba origins had become Ilorin indigenes); but 
there was significant penetration of other Igbo as well as non-Igbo groups into the Aba 
clusters. The integration of other communities into the Aba clusters accelerated 
markedly in the adjustment era, reducing the strength of the founding hometown 
communities to less than half of firms. There were also marked shifts in the generational 
composition of firm heads, as single and often poorly capitalized young men under 30 
became a force to be reckoned with, often challenging occupational norms of quality 
and price regulation in their haste to get ahead. Economic restructuring also triggered a 
rapid rise in educated entrants from more advantaged class backgrounds as retrenched 
or underpaid civil servants, formal sector workers and unemployed graduates flooded 
in. By the early 2000s, more than one-third of weavers and 65 per cent of garment 
producers had secondary education or better, and 13 per cent and 7 per cent, 
respectively, had some post-secondary education. More striking was the rise in 
producers from more privileged class backgrounds. Nearly one-third of weavers and 
one-quarter of garment producers hailed from these more advantaged backgrounds, 
along with nearly 20 per cent of shoe producers. 
Gender was the only aspect of the social composition of clusters that did not change 
significantly. Women remained excluded as firm heads in both the weaving and the 
shoe clusters. Similarly, women continued to make up about half of firm heads in the 
garment cluster, but with some incursion of men into the sewing of high fashion 
women’s clothes. These observations suggest limits to the notion that popular livelihood 
networks improve economic opportunities for women (Tripp 2001). 
Despite processes of social restructuring that appeared to foster a denser and more 
inclusive social fabric (at least for men), the effect was to erode rather than enhance 
collective action within the clusters. Greater communal, generational and class 
diversity, combined with rapid entry under intense livelihood pressure, tended to 
overwhelm embedded regulatory structures, weakening informal commercial 
institutions and local sanctions against opportunistic behaviour. Faced with 
overburdened informal regulatory systems and collapsing credit networks, producers 
shifted to more individual forms of networking to shore up their business networks. 
They drew on personal ties of community, religious affiliation, friendship or school 
connections to cobble together individual networks of supply, labour, credit and 
marketing opportunities. Enterprise networks were increasingly defined by an 
individual’s portfolio of ties, rather than by collective arrangements at the cluster level, 
fuelling new processes of differentiation and network fragmentation. More educated 
producers or those with advantaged class backgrounds could develop new credit or 
marketing networks by linking up with influential relatives or friends in formal sector 
firms, while less advantaged producers were confined to unstable networks of poor 
relations, friends and members of their church or mosque in their efforts to mobilize 
customers, labour or loans. 
High levels of associational participation have not eased processes of popular 
organizational fragmentation. Both Yoruba and Igbo society are characterized by 
widespread participation in hometown associations and other types of popular 
organizations. Producers in the Ilorin weaving cluster belonged to an average of 2.3 
associations, rising to an average of 3.0 in the garment cluster and 4.2 in the shoe cluster 
(Table 4). While religious and hometown or ward associations predominated, producers 
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Table 3 
Changing social profiles of enterprise clusters after SAP 
Enterprise 
cluster 
Firm heads: 
Female firm 
heads (%) 
from original 
communities (%) 
aged 30 years
 or under (%) 
from advantaged class 
backgrounds (%) 
with secondary 
education (%) 
Ilorin weaving 100.0  17.3 30.8 38.4 0.0 
Aba garments 44.3  39.0 26.3 65.5 44.3 
Aba shoes 14.1  49.3 18.5 12.7 0.0 
Source:  Fieldwork. 
Table 4 
Patterns of associational participation 
Cluster 
Avg. no.  
of voluntary 
associations joined 
Cluster-based 
producers’ 
association  
Hometown 
 or local area 
associations  
Religious 
associations  Social clubs 
 (% of heads)  
Ilorin weaving 2.3 90.4 38.4 46.1 5.8 
Aba garments 3.0 6.6 63.9 85.2 9.8 
Aba shoes 4.2 83.1 81.7 77.5 18.0 
Source:  Fieldwork. 
also participated in a range of social clubs, political associations and rotating credit 
societies. Far from creating a dense ‘web of associational life’, however, individualized 
livelihood networks and participation in popular associations intensified network 
differentiation. Four distinct types of networks emerged, each fostering very different 
forms of economic and political engagement. These networks can be described as 
‘patrimonialist’, ‘modernist’, ‘diversification’ and ‘desperation’ (Meagher 2009). The 
first two represent paths of accumulation, while the last two constitute types of survival 
strategy.  
Patrimonialist networks involved established producers and entrants from advantaged 
class backgrounds, who tended to follow a strategy of integration into established 
cliental networks through significant investment in resources and time. In the weaving 
cluster, linking into the establishment involved participation in the traditional weavers’ 
guild, known as Tawakalitu (Arabic: I stand with God), which was the central channel 
of patrimonial engagement between Ilorin weavers and the local, state and federal 
governments. In the shoe and garment clusters, patrimonialist networks revolved around 
participation in one’s hometown association, which tended to fragment occupational 
interests given the growing range of Igbo groups that had entered these activities. In all 
three cases, patrimonial strategies appealed to producers with sufficient resources and 
social status to work the system, but tended to marginalize women, youth and those 
from less advantaged class backgrounds. 
While established and middle-class producers used networks and associations to embed 
themselves in the patrimonial system, highly skilled producers from more lowly 
backgrounds tended to opt for a contrary strategy of disembedding themselves from 
local patrimonial networks. Modernist producers revealed a decisive shift from cliental 
forms of engagement to networks that rewarded skills and hard work rather than wealth 
and social status. In the Ilorin weaving cluster, modernists were associated with non-
participation in the traditional weavers’ guild. This was accompanied by the joining of 
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alternative weavers’ associations geared to the concerns of more skilled or educated 
producers—the most influential of which is Oluhunkunmi (Yoruba: God is with me)—
or by participation in the Tijaniyya brotherhood or the Ansarudeen Islamic society, both 
groups with a strong work ethic and educational orientation. In the Aba clusters, a 
modernist strategy involved rejecting participation in one’s hometown association in 
favour of conversion to exclusivist Pentecostal religious societies, such as Deeper Life 
or Jehovah’s Witness. In all three cases, modernists effectively followed a Weberian 
strategy of frugality, skills and hard work, often articulated through conversion to non-
orthodox religious movements or new associations. These strategies represented a 
rejection of cliental engagement by producers who lacked the wealth and status to 
advance through collaboration with patrimonial interests, but had the skills to prosper 
through innovation and enterprise investment. 
The third form of networking, diversification, is a risk-reducing strategy rather than a 
strategy of accumulation. Reminiscent of the dynamic described by Berry (1993) in her 
article ‘Coping with confusion’, diversification strategies represented an attempt to 
multiply rather than focus networks in order to maximize access to sources of income 
and assistance. Among shoe and garment producers, diversification was associated with 
participation in hometown associations as well as in Pentecostal religious societies 
and/or social clubs. Among Ilorin weavers, where neither Pentecostalism nor drinking 
are acceptable options, diversification involved participation in political associations 
and various types of Islamic societies in addition to their weavers’ association. 
Successful weavers tend to regard membership in political associations as a sign of 
failure, since the incentive for joining is to look for crumbs from the state rather than 
earning a dignified living through weaving. Among diversifiers, ‘connectivity’ by any 
means is the order of the day, but such thinly spread resources were associated with a 
lack of enterprise growth. 
The final strategy, ‘desperation’, involved clinging to a few ascriptive and friendship 
networks owing to a lack of resources to diversify, and a lack of skills or social status to 
chart a course of accumulation. Membership in associations was minimal, owing to a 
lack of time and resources for effective participation. Producers were simply obliged to 
make do with the unreliable and intermittent connections available to them. 
Owing to the differing social histories of the three clusters, different network strategies 
have come to dominate processes of accumulation and authority in each cluster 
(Table 5). In the weaving cluster and shoe cluster, patrimonial strategies represent the 
main path of accumulation, owing to the low status and comparatively low levels of 
education in these activities. In the shoe cluster, patrimonial strategies account for 16 
per cent of firms but generate 30 per cent of the cluster’s turnover. In the weaving 
cluster, which has been affected by a serious market downturn for over a decade, 
patrimonial strategies represent 9 per cent of firms but control 16 per cent of the 
cluster’s income. While modernist networks exist in both clusters, they have performed 
less well, in both cases generating income shares below their share of firms. That said, 
modernists in the weaving cluster have managed to capture a nearly proportionate share 
of resources, and appear to be gaining in economic and organizational strength. 
By contrast, modernist networks dominate accumulation in the garment cluster, where 
mechanization and education have been central forces from the beginning. Male 
garment producers with lower class backgrounds who belong to exclusive Pentecostal 
religious groups account for 8 per cent of firms, but for 31 per cent of the turnover in 
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the cluster. Conversely, producers with advantaged class backgrounds who belong to 
their hometown association have performed poorly. In all three clusters, the remaining 
majority of producers are caught in unsuccessful accumulation and survival strategies 
that leave them with a disadvantageous income share. 
The analysis of informal livelihood strategies has shown that, rather than creating a 
dense network of associational life, the intense networking and associational activity 
evident in these enterprise clusters have given rise to an increasingly fragmented terrain 
of popular organization. Through distinctive strategies of accumulation and survival, the 
‘politics of resource mobilization’ (Lourenço-Lindell 2002) has fractured enterprise 
clusters into divergent networks shaped by differing patterns of identity, religion, class, 
generation and gender. As Knorringa (1999: 1593) points out in the context of an Indian 
shoe cluster, differentiation into networks with distinctive social and class identities 
limits flows of resources and skills between successful and poorer producers. It also 
limits prospects for collective action that represents the interests of the majority of 
members. Understanding how the micro-politics of informal livelihood networks 
influences wider processes of urban governance requires a closer look at how dominant 
networks within a given cluster shape interaction between cluster associations and local 
as well as regional government. 
Table 5 
Networks of accumulation and turnover shares 
 Patrimonial strategy Disembedding strategy Survival strategies 
Clusters % of firms % of turnover % of firms % of turnover % of firms % of turnover
Ilorin weaving 9 16  11 10  80 74 
Aba garments 8 4  8 31  84 65 
Aba shoes 16 30  9 4  75 66 
Source: Fieldwork. 
4 Cluster associations and public action 
As Haan (1999) and others have noted, African enterprise associations tend to be 
dominated by the most successful producers, meaning that networks of accumulation 
tend to define the politics of cluster associations. In the case of the three clusters 
examined here, the different social histories of the clusters have given rise to very 
different accumulation strategies, and hence to cluster associations that relate to the 
state in distinctive ways. However, the effectiveness of popular organizations is 
influenced by both how they relate to the state and how the state relates to them. 
Tracing how these popular livelihood networks feed into urban governance thus 
involves a dual process of examining how enterprise networks shape the politics of 
cluster associations, and how these associations are in turn shaped by the nature of the 
state. 
All three of these Nigerian enterprise clusters have well established producers’ 
associations. The main associations emerged independently of the state, have existed for 
a decade or more, and provide a range of basic regulatory and social welfare services. In 
the Aba shoe cluster, there are six zonal associations the oldest of which dates from the 
mid-1970s, and 83 per cent of firms in the cluster belong to their local association. 
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However, lowly occupational and educational status has limited the ability of this large 
and dynamic group of associations to engage politically with government through 
formal channels. Instead, patrimonial strategies of accumulation have fostered relations 
with government officials that are characterized by collusion and kickbacks rather than 
representation of member interests. Inadequate resources to offer real business services, 
and the tendency of the associational leadership to monopolize benefits, have bred 
disillusionment and mistrust among the rank-and-file of shoe producers who describe 
their leaders as ‘hungry lions’. 
In the garment cluster, there was only one association in operation by the early 2000s, 
which had started up in 1984. The strong modernist strategy of the relatively educated 
leadership, drawn from the most successful firms in the cluster, fostered efforts to 
engage with the state through formal rather than patrimonial channels. The leadership of 
the garment association largely abstained from their hometown association, and avoided 
patrimonial lobbying of officials, despite the fact that many of the top garment 
producers came from the same Igbo community as the state governor at that time. 
Instead, the association forged links with the Nigerian small business association 
(NASSI), assisted firms to register formally, and even took the government to court 
over a case of official harassment. While this strategy allowed the garment association 
to circumvent negligent and corrupt political forces, it also threw a powerless group of 
micro-producers into the formal political and economic arena, where their low class 
backgrounds and refusal to ‘work the system’ left them severely handicapped despite their 
skills and education. Moreover, the professional orientation of the garment cluster 
alienated them even from their own constituency. Only 7 per cent of the garment cluster 
were members of the association, owing to a pervasive clash between the survivalist 
orientation of the majority, and the modernizing orientation of the leadership. 
The Ilorin weaving cluster is dominated by a weavers’ guild that has existed since pre-
colonial times, and still enjoys the membership of 75 per cent of weavers. As in the Aba 
shoe cluster, the dominance of patrimonial strategies of accumulation, combined with 
low levels of education particularly among the elderly leadership, have confined this 
association to cliental forms of engagement with the state that revolve around tax 
exemptions, handouts to the association at election time, and official initiatives relating 
to arts and culture displays rather than much needed enterprise assistance. Tensions with 
the modernist weavers split the association in the early 1990s, giving rise to a new 
weavers’ association, Oluhunkunmi, that pursues an anti-cliental strategy of bypassing 
local and regional government channels and attempting to solicit enterprise assistance 
from federal government sources. So far, they have had little success in getting the 
federal government to take them seriously, owing to educational handicaps and the low-
status, unmechanized character of their activity. 
From the other side of the governance equation, the nature of state engagement with 
enterprise clusters and their associations does not appear likely to improve prospects for 
pro-poor governance. A spate of governance reforms since the 1990s has done little to 
increase popular empowerment or official accountability. Significant decentralization of 
authority, service provision and taxation to local government has been accompanied by 
an enormous increase in revenue allocation from the federal government, with the result 
that petrol resources from the centre now account for over 90 per cent of local 
government finances (Wunsch and Olowu 1997). The overwhelming significance of oil 
revenues, even at the local government level, combined with problems of poorly 
institutionalized local government structures and rampant corruption, have left local 
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officials less rather than more inclined to engage with the demands of the urban poor. 
Mounting demands from all three enterprise clusters for basic enterprise support and 
improvements in the deplorable state of the infrastructure have fallen on deaf ears. The 
result has been a descent of all three clusters into a state of economic crisis and decline 
in recent years, owing to mounting economic and regulatory pressures, and collapsing 
markets and infrastructure. 
In the face of lack of state interest, neither patrimonial nor modernist strategies of 
associational engagement have brought about any improvements in the clusters’ access 
to even the most basic urban and business services. The social and often legal 
marginality of the groups involved, and the increasing fragmentation of cluster networks 
and associations, have continued to undermine their ability to influence political 
decisionmaking, whether through patrimonial or more formal channels. At the same 
time, poverty and network fragmentation have increased tendencies toward ethnic and 
religious polarization within the clusters, and intensified the vulnerability of cluster 
associations to mobilization in the service of more powerful political interests. In their 
struggles for increased access to resources and services, the garment association 
collapsed in 2007 owing to divisive links with an international NGO, and the weaving 
cluster is grounded by struggles between the patrimonialist and modernist weavers’ 
associations. In both clusters, the failure to gain the ear of the state has led to mounting 
enterprise failure, with young men haemorrhaging out of the clusters to swell the 
chaotic and volatile ranks of hawkers and motorcycle taxi drivers. The Aba shoe 
associations managed to capture the ear of the state by forming a vigilante group known 
as the Bakassi Boys to improve security in Aba. Far from contributing to enterprise 
development, however, this initiative was hijacked by Igbo state governors and turned 
into a notorious ethnic militia that terrorized much of south-eastern Nigeria during the 
run-up to Nigeria’s 2003 elections (Human Rights Watch 2002; Meagher 2007a; Ukiwo 
2002). Instead of contributing to pro-poor governance, exemplary efforts at popular 
organization in all three clusters have tended to exacerbate a situation of lack of 
governance and economic decline. 
5 Conclusion: Political voice and the ‘devil’s deal’ 
This paper has examined how the micro-politics of popular livelihood networks feeds 
into processes of governance at the local level. The ‘best case’ scenario of dynamic 
Nigerian enterprise clusters reveals that it takes more than dense webs of social 
networks to create a framework for collective action, and it takes more than political 
decentralization to generate participatory structures of urban governance. Despite large 
and dynamic enterprise clusters headed by comparatively well organized associations, 
and significant devolution of government structures, the relationship of local 
government to popular enterprise associations perpetuates a dynamic of neglect and 
collusion rather than encouraging synergy between popular organizations and the state. 
The political voice of the poor is not only constrained by lack of connectivity with 
government, but critically by a lack of social and economic power to represent their 
own interests in devolved government structures. The same networks of identity, class, 
religion and gender that the poor use to construct livelihood networks and popular 
associations tie them into relations of dependence and vulnerability in the wider 
political arena. 
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The way forward lies in considering not only how to create associations among the 
urban poor, and how to bring them closer to government structures, but how to 
empower those associations to make effective claims on government. Ongoing research 
on the role of alliances with labour unions, supportive NGOs, and sympathetic local 
governments explores some of the ways in which networks of popular power can be 
developed (Horn 2003; ILO 2002). Horn (2003) and Thulare (2004) have also 
emphasized the importance of developing internal structures of representation and 
accountability within popular associations, something that is unlikely to happen 
spontaneously owing to internal inequalities in power and resources. Promoting 
participatory development demands a greater focus on how power as well as sociability 
shape the institutions of the poor. Otherwise, current efforts at pro-poor governance will 
only generate new and more presentable versions of ‘the devil’s deal’.  
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